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Abstract
In this paper we present a new class of values for cooperative games with level structure.
We use a multi-step proceeding, suggested first in Owen (1977), applied to the weighted
Shapley values. Our first axiomatization is an generalisation of the axiomatization given
in Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011), itselves an extension of a special case of an ax-
iomatization given in Myerson (1980) and Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) respectively by
efficiency and weighted balanced contributions. The second axiomatization is completely
new and extends the axiomatization of the weighted Shapley values introduced in Hart
and Mas-Colell (1989) by weighted standardness for two player games and consistency.
As a corollary we obtain a new axiomatization of the Shapley levels value.
Keywords Cooperative game · Consistency · Level structure · (Weighted) Shapley
(levels) value · Weighted balanced contributions
1 Introduction
Presenting his famous value for coalition structures, Owen (1977) suggested an extension
of his value that
”... deals with union structure hierarchies, i. e., the possibility that, inside each
union, there may be some groups who are closer together then the remaining
members of the union. For example, some of the union members may belong
to a certain clan, and will therefore make a common front against the other
union members.”
Winter (1989) was the first one who putted this idea into action by constructing a model
for hierarchical structures, called level structure. Then he defined his value, we call it
Shapley levels value, by a set of axioms, which are extensions of axioms of an axiomatiza-
tion of the Owen value (Owen, 1977). Another axiomatization of the Shapley levels value
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2is presented in Calvo, Lasaga and Winter (1996, Theorem 2). They extended there the
axiomatization of the Shapley value in Myerson (1980) and Hart and Mas-Colell (1989)
respectively by efficiency and balanced contributions to level structures to determine the
Shapley levels value uniquely.
This proceeding in mind Vidal-Puga (2012) defined initially a weighted value for coali-
tion structures and Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011) extended it to level structures.
Their value is axiomatized by an extension of an axiomatization of the weighted Shapley
values presented in Myerson (1980) and Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) too. So this value is
axiomatized by efficiency and an extension of a special case of weighted balanced contri-
butions, called balanced per capita contributions. By this value all coalitions have been
assigned weights given by the cardinality of the coalitions. In difference to the Shapley
levels value, acting coalitions are only be treated as symmetric if they contain the same
amount of players.
But sometimes this approach is not adequate, e.g. if some coalitions, fairly independent
from the size of the coalition, have a lack of ability to perform or not the same political
power and so on. To be no longer restricted to that limitation we introduce arbitrary
exogenously given weights for the coalitions which become prominent if the coalitions act
as players. So we can introduce the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values. The axiom-
atization of the value from Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011) can be easily transferred
to an axiomatization given by efficiency and weighted balanced group contributions, a
general extension of weighted balanced contributions in Myerson (1980).
Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) presented another axiomatization of the weighted Shapley
values. They used the weighted standardness property, that means that in a two player
game the cooperation benefit has to be divided proportional to the weights of the players,
and a consistency property. Consistency requires the payout to a player in a reduced
game be the same as the payoff to this player in the original game if the reduced game
is defined appropriate. As main part of the paper, we extend this axiomatization to level
structures that determines the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values uniquely.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Some preliminaires are given in section 2, in section 3
are introduced the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values and an axiomatization in the
sense of Calvo, Lasaga and Winter (1996, Theorem 2), section 4 presents a new consistency
property with an related axiomatization and section 5 gives a short conclusion.
2 Preliminaries
In some definitions and notations we will follow with Besner (2018a). Let R be the real
numbers, R++ the set of all positive real numbers, U a countably infinite set, the universe
of all possible players, and N the set of all finite subsets N ⊆ U, N 6= ∅. A TU-game
is a pair (N, v) where N ∈ N and v : 2N→ R, v(∅) = 0, 2N := {S : S ⊆ N}, is called a
coalition function. We call v(S) the worth of coalition S ⊆ N , we denote by ΩS the
set of all nonempty subsets of S and the set of all TU-games with player set N is denoted
by VN. (S, v) is the restriction of (N, v) to S ∈ ΩN and a player i ∈ N is called a null
player in v if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S), S ⊆ N\{i}.
B := {B1, ..., Bm} is said to be a coalition structure on N if Bk∩B` = ∅, 1 ≤ k < ` ≤
m, Bk 6= ∅ for all k, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, and
⋃m
k=1Bk = N . We call each B ∈ B a component
3and B(i) denotes the component that contains the player i ∈ N .
A finite sequence B := {B0, ...,Bh+1} of coalition structures Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h + 1, on
N is called a level structure (Winter, 1989) on N if Br is a refinement of Br+1 for
each r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, i. e. Br(i) ⊆ Br+1(i) for all i ∈ N , B0 = {{i} : i ∈ N} and
Bh+1 = {N}. Br denotes the r-th level of B and Br(Bk) denotes the component of
the r-th level that contains the component Bk ∈ Bk, 0 ≤ k ≤ r ≤ h + 1. The set of
all level structures with player set N is denoted by LN. A triple (N, v,B) consisting
of a TU-game (N, v) ∈ VN and a level structure B ∈ LN is called an LS-game. The
collection of all LS-games on N is denoted by VLN. Each (N, v,B0) with a trivial level
structure B0 := {B0,B1} corresponds to a TU-game (N, v) and each LS-game (N, v,B1),
B1 := {B0,B1,B2}, corresponds to a game with coalition structure as introduced in Aumann
and Dre`ze (1974), in (Owen (1977) called ”games with a priori unions”.
Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, and T ∈ ΩN :
• From a level structure on N follows a restricted level structure on T by eliminating
the players in N\T . With coalition structures Br|T := {B ∩ T : B ∈ Br, B ∩ T 6= ∅},
0 ≤ r ≤ h+ 1, the new level structure on T is given by B|T := {B0|T , ...,Bh+1|T} ∈ LT
and (T, v,B|T ) ∈ VLT is called the restriction of (N, v,B) to player set T .
• We define Br := {Br0, ...,Brh+1−r} ∈ LBr, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, as the induced r-th level
structure from B by considering the components B ∈ Br as players, where Brk :={{B ∈ Br : B ⊆ B′} : B′ ∈ Br+k}, 0 ≤ k ≤ h+ 1− r. The induced r-th level game(Br, vr,Br) ∈ GLBr is given by
vr(Q) := v(
⋃
B∈Q
B) for all Q ⊆ Br.1 (1)
• We define Br :=
{B0, ...,Br, {N}} ∈ LN, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, as the r-th cut level structure
from B if we cut out all levels between the r-th and the (h+ 1)-th level. (N, v,Br) is
called the r-th cut of (N, v,B). Note that we have for each B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} also
B = Bh.
A TU-value φ is an operator that assigns a payoff vector φ(N, v) ∈ RN to any (N, v) ∈
VN, an LS-value ϕ is an operator that assigns a payoff vector ϕ(N, v, B) ∈ RN to any
(N, v, B) ∈ VLN.
We define W:= {f : U→ R++} with wi := w(i) for all w ∈W and i ∈ U as the set of all
positive weight systems on the universe of all players and we define W2N := {f : 2N\∅ →
R++} with wS := w(S) for all w ∈ W2N, as the set of all positive weight systems on all
coalitions S ∈ ΩN.
The (simply) weighted Shapley values2 Shw (Shapley, 1953a) are defined by
Shwi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
wi∑
j∈S wj
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N and w ∈W. (2)
The Shapley value Sh (Shapley, 1953b) that distributes the dividends ∆v(S) equally
among all players of a coalition S is a special case of a weighted Shapley value, given by
Shi(N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
∆v(S)
|S| for all i ∈ N.
1In Owen (1977), where we have the special case r = 1, such a game is called as quotient game.
2We desist from possibly null weights as in Shapley (1953a) or Kalai and Samet (1987).
4Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN,B = Bh, T ∈ ΩN, T 3 i, and
KT (i) :=
h∏
r=0
KrT (i), where K
r
T (i) :=
1
|{B ∈ Br : B⊆ Br+1(i), B ∩ T 6= ∅}| .
The Shapley Levels value3 ShL (Winter, 1989) is given by
ShLi (N, v,B) :=
∑
T⊆N,T3i
KT (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N.
Obvious coincides ShL with Sh if h = 0. It is well-known that ShL coincides with the
Owen value (Owen, 1977) if h = 1.
We refer to the following axioms for LS-values which are adaptions of standard-axioms
for TU-values (with the exception of the last axiom):4
Efficiency, E. For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, we have ∑i∈N ϕi(N, v,B) = v(N).
Null player, N. For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN and i ∈ N a null player in v, we have
ϕi(N, v,B) = 0.
Additivity, A. For all (N, v, B), (N, v′, B) ∈ VLN, we have
ϕ(N, v,B) + ϕ(N, v′,B) = ϕ(N, v + v′,B).
Balanced group contributions, BGC (Calvo, Lasaga and Winter, 1996). For all
(N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, Bk, B` ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk), we have∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N\B`, v,B|N\B`) =
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N\Bk, v,B|N\Bk).
This axiom states that for two components Bk, B` of the same level which belong to the
same component one level higher the contribution of B` to the total payoff of all players
from Bk equals the contribution of Bk to the total payoff of all players from B`.
Standardness, ST0. (Myerson, 1980) For all (N, v) ∈ VN, N = {i, j}, i 6= j, we have
ϕi(N, v) = v({i}) + 1
2
[
v({i, j})− v({i})− v({j})].
Standardness leads to sharing the surplus by cooperating in two player games that the
surplus is divided equally. The following axiom stands for dividing the surplus in two
player games proportional to the weights of the players.
Weighted standardness, WS0. (Myerson, 1980) For all (N, v) ∈ VN, N = {i, j}, i 6= j,
and w ∈W, we have
ϕi(N, v) = v({i}) + wi
wi + wj
[
v({i, j})− v({i})− v({j})].
The next axiom has the meaning that the sum of the payoff to all players in a component
coincides with the payoff to this component if this component is regarded as a player in
an induced level game.
Level game property, LG (Winter, 1989). For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, B ∈
Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h+ 1, we have ∑
i∈B
ϕi(N, v,B) = ϕB(Br, vr,Br).
3This formula is presented in Calvo, Lasaga and Winter (1996, eq. (1))
4In the case of using a subdomain, we require an axiom to hold when all games belong to this subdomain.
If there are used weights for some coalitions, these weights are still valid in the subdomain.
53 Weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values
Owen (1977) suggested for his value a two-step approach where the first step consists of
using the Shapley value on the quotient game that corresponds to a first induced level
game. In the second stage the Shapley value is applied to the result of the first step
again. The same procedure adapted Vidal-Puga (2012) for the value ζ, an extension
of a weighted Shapley value to coalition structures where the weights are given by the
size of the coalitions. Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011) presented an extension to level
structures and replaced the two-step approach by a multi-step mechanism as suggested
also in Owen (1977). It is still not known and there is no hint in Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-
Puga (2011) that their value can easily generalized to an extension of the weighted Shapley
values in general if someone knows how to deal with arbitrary exogenously given weights
for coalitions. The substantial idea behind our definition, similar suggested in Owen
(1977) and implemented as an algorithm in Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011) is as
follows:
In a first step we distribute the worth of the grand coalition v(N) among the components
Bh of the h−th level as players using a weighted Shapley value. In the second step each
payoff to a component Bh from the first step is splitted up by the weighted Shapley value
to all components Bh−1 (the new players) which are subsets of the component Bh and so
on for all levels. In the last step we distribute the payoff to components B1 from the first
level among the original players i ∈ N . Therefore we need a weight system for coalitions
to have weights if a coalition is regarded as a player. For notational parsimony we give
the following notation.
Notation 3.1. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, i ∈ N and T ∈ ΩBk(i), 0 ≤ k ≤ h. We
denote by T ki := {B ∈ Bk : B ⊆ Bk+1(i), B 6= Bk(i)} ∪ {T} the set that contains all
components of the k-th level which are subsets of the component of the (k + 1)-th level
that contains the player i without the component of the k-th level containing player i and
that contains in addition the coalition T .
Definition 3.2. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, w ∈ W2N, i ∈ N and let for all k, 0 ≤
k ≤ h, T ∈ ΩBk(i), T ki the set from notation 3.1, wk,T ∈W a weight system with coalitions
S as players such that wk,TS := wS, wS ∈ w, for all S ∈ T ki , v¯h+1i := v and v¯ki given by
v¯ki (T ) := Sh
wk,T
T (T ki , v˜ki ) for all T ∈ ΩB
k(i) (3)
where v˜ki is specified by
v˜ki (Q) := v¯k+1i (
⋃
S∈Q
S) for all Q ⊆ T ki .
Then the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels value ShwHL is defined by
ShwHLi (N, v,B) := v¯0i ({i}) for all i ∈ N.
Remarks 3.3. ShwHL coincides with Shw if B = B0 and w{i} = wi for all i ∈ N . Since
Shw is efficient and additive, it is obvious, that ShwHL meets E, A and LG.
Similar to Calvo, Lasaga and Winter (1996), which characterized the Shapley levels
value by efficiency and balanced group contributions, Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011)
characterized their value by efficiency and balanced per capita contributions, a special
case of the following axiom where the weights are the size of the relevant components.
6Weighted balanced group contributions, WBGC5. For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B =
Bh, w ∈ W2N, Bk, B` ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk), we have∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N\B`, v,B|N\B`)
wBk
=
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N\Bk, v,B|N\Bk)
wB`
.
In difference to BGC, here the contributions of one component to the players of the other
component and vice versa are proportional to the weights of the components.
Theorem 3.4. Let w ∈ W2N. ShwHL is the unique LS-value that satisfies E and WBGC.
Proof. It is clear that def. 3.2 is equivalent to the algorithm given in Go´mez-Ru´a and
Vidal-Puga (2011, section 3) if we use as weights the cardinality of the coalitions. Thus
the rest of the proof of theorem 3.4 is omitted because it’s only an exercise to adapt
the proofs of proposition 7 and theorem 8 in Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011), using
weighted balanced contributions (Myerson, 1980; Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989) for the
weighted Shapley values in proposition 7 and replacing the given weights (size of the
components) by arbitrary weights in theorem 8.
Remark 3.5. If all weights are equal, we use in fact in line (3) the Shapley value and
WBGC equals BGC. So, by Calvo, Lasaga and Winter (1996, Theorem 2), def. 3.2
determines in this case the Shapley levels value ShL.
Remark 3.6. As shown by example 1 in Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011), ShwHL
doesn’t satisfy N in general.
4 Level-consistency
Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) used a consistency property to characterize the weighted
Shapley values. Therefore they introduced a reduced game of a TU -game.
Definition 4.1. Let (N, v) ∈ VN, R ∈ ΩN and φ a TU-value. The reduced game
(R, vφR) ∈ VR is given for all S ∈ ΩR by
vφR(S) := v
(
S ∪Rc)−∑
j∈Rc
φj
(
S ∪Rc, v) (4)
where Rc := N\R.
Remark 4.2. If φ is efficient eq. (4) can be simplified to
vφR(S) :=
∑
j∈S
φj
(
S ∪Rc, v).
The interpretation of a reduced game must be seen in context with a TU-value that must
have a special property. So Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) formulated the following axiom.
Consistency, C. For all (N, v) ∈ VN, R ⊆ N, we have φi(N, v) = φi(R, vφR) for all i ∈ R.
5This axiom extends weighted balanced contributions (Myerson, 1980).
7The meaning of this axiom is as follows: A coalition of players Rc leaves the game. In
the reduced game each coalition S which is a subset of the coalition R of the remaining
players obtains the worth of the old coalition S ∪ Rc less the payoff that the removed
players obtain in a game played on S ∪ Rc. Then a TU-value is consistent if the players
in R obtain in the reduced and in the original game the same payoff. It turned out that
the weighted Shapley values have got an intense connection to this axiom.
Theorem 4.3. (Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989) Let w ∈ W. Shw is the unique TU-value
that satisfies C and WS 0.
If we exchange WS0 by ST0 this theorem characterizes the Shapley value. By adding
LG, Winter (1992) extended this axiomatization for the Shapley value to the Owen value
(see proof of theorem 3 in Winter (1992)). Similar Huettner (2015) transferred the related
axiomatization of Feldman (1999) and Ortmann (1999) for the proportional value to his
proportional value for coalition structures. Our new reduced game for level structures
extends the reduced game for TU-games in Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) too but it is no
extension of the reduced game used in Winter (1992) and Huettner (2015) respectively.
Definition 4.4. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, R ∈ ΩN such that R =
⋃
Q∈BhQ and ϕ
an LS-value. The reduced level game (R, vϕR,B|R) ∈ VLR is given for all S ∈ ΩR by
vϕR(S) := v(S ∪Rc)−
∑
Q∈Bh, Q*R
ϕQ
(Bh|S∪Rc , vh,Bh|S∪Rc) (5)
where Rc := N\R and (Bh|S∪Rc , vh,Bh|S∪Rc) is the induced h-th level game restricted to
S ∪Rc.
Remark 4.5. If B = B0, def. 4.4 coincides with def. 4.1.
Remark 4.6. If ϕ is efficient eq. (5) can be simplified to
vϕR(S) :=
∑
Q∈Bh, Q⊆R
ϕS∩Q
(Bh|S∪Rc , vh,Bh|S∪Rc).
The following axiom extends C.
Level-consistency, LC. For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, R =
⋃
Q∈BhQ, we have
ϕi(N, v, B) = ϕi(R, vϕR,B|R) for all i ∈ R. (6)
R is a coalition of all players of some components of the h-th level. All players of coalition
Rc of the players of the other components of the h-th level leave the game. In the reduced
level game each coalition S ∈ ΩR obtains the worth of the old coalition S ∪ Rc less the
payoff that the removed components obtain in the induced h-th level game restricted to
S ∪ Rc. Then an LS-value is consistent if each player in R obtain in the reduced game
the same payoff as in the original game.
Remark 4.7. If B = B0, LC coincides with C.
We adapt WS0 to level structures.
Weighted standardness, WS. For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN with B = B0, N = {i, j}, i 6=
j, and w ∈ W2N, we have
ϕi(N, v, B) = v({i}) + w{i}
w{i} + w{j}
[
v({i, j})− v({i})− v({j})].
8To characterize the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values finally we need a very weak
property that states that if the h-th level consists only of one component we can remove
this level from the game without consequences.
Inessential level property, IL. For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, h ≥ 1, and Bh =
Bh+1 we have ϕ(N, v, B) = ϕ(N, v, Bh−1).
The last three properties fit best with the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values:
Theorem 4.8. Let w ∈ W2N. ShwHL satisfies IL, WS and LC.
Proof. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh and w ∈ W2N:
• IL: If Bh = Bh+1 we have in notation 3.1 for all i ∈ N and T ∈ ΩBh(i), T hi = {T}. It
follows in line (3), v¯hi (T ) = Sh
wh,T
T ({T}, v˜hi ) = v(T ) for all T ∈ ΩBh(i). Thus, if h ≥ 1,
we have no change in line (3) for all k, 0 ≤ k ≤ h− 1, if we drop the h-th level and IL
is shown.
• WS: By def. (3.2) and line (2) the claim is obvious.
• LC: Let i ∈ N, R = ⋃Q∈BhQ, R ⊇ Bh(i). By IL it is sufficient to show LC on level
structures Bh with Bh 6= Bh+1. If R = N or |N | = 1, eq. (6) is trivially satisfied.
Let now |N | ≥ 2 and R 6= N . By Hart and Mas-Colell (1989), Shw satisfies C for all
w ∈W. For each T ∈ ΩBh(i) we have a set T hi from notation 3.1 and a related T hi |R on
the restricted level structure B|R. Thus follows by eq. (3) for k = h
v¯hi (T ) = Sh
wh,T
T (T hi , v˜hi ) =
C,
rem. 4.5
Shw
h,T
T
(T hi |R, (v˜ϕR)hi ) (7)
where (v˜ϕR)
h
i is given by (v˜
ϕ
R)
h
i (Q) := vϕR(
⋃
S∈Q S) for all Q ⊆ T hi |R. Thus there is no
difference in eq. (3) between both games for all k 6= h too and LC is shown.
It transpires that the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values are characterized by the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.9. Let w ∈ W2N. ShwHL is the unique TU-value that satisfies IL, WS and
LC.
Proof. By theorem 4.8 it is sufficient to show uniqueness. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B =
Bh, w ∈ W2N, i ∈ N arbitrary and ϕ an LS-values that satisfies IL, WS and LC. By LC,
we have
ϕj(N, v, B) = ϕj(Bh(i), vϕBh(i),B|Bh(i)) for all j ∈ Bh(i)
where vϕBh(i) is unique by WS, LC, rem. 4.7, rem. 4.5 and theorem 4.3.
By IL, we have for each restricted k-th cut level structure Bk|Bk(i), k > 0, from B on
Bk(i),
ϕ(Bk(i), vˆϕBk(i), Bk|Bk(i)) = ϕ(Bk(i), vˆϕBk(i), Bk−1|Bk(i))
where vˆϕBk(i) is recursive defined by
vˆϕBk(i) :=
{
vϕBh(i) if k = h,(
vˆϕBk+1(i)
)ϕ
Bk(i) else.
9Hence by an induction on the levels k, IL and LC it follows that
ϕj(N, v, B) = ϕj(B1(i), vˆϕB1(i),B0|B1(i)) for all j ∈ B1(i)
where vˆϕB1(i) is unique by WS, LC, rem. 4.7, rem. 4.5 and theorem 4.3. Therefore, by WS,
LC, rem. 4.7, rem. 4.5 and theorem 4.3, ϕ is well defined and the proof is completed.
To introduce a new axiomatization of the Shapley levels value we adapt ST0.
Standardness, ST. For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN with B = B0 and N = {i, j}, i 6= j, we
have
ϕi(N, v, B) = v({i}) + 1
2
[
v({i, j})− v({i})− v({j})].
Since ST is a special case of WS we obtain the following corollary by theorem 4.9.
Corollary 4.10. ShL is the unique TU-value that satisfies IL, ST and LC.
Remark 4.11. The axioms in theorem 4.9 are logically independent.
Proof. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh and w ∈ W2N:
• IL: The LS-value ϕ defined by
ϕ :=
{
1
2
ShwHL, if h ≥ 1,
ShwHL, else,
satisfies WS and LC but not IL.
• WS: Let v ∈ VN, v(S) > 0 for all S ∈ ΩN, and B = B1. If we regard the propor-
tional value for cooperative games with a coalition structure in Huettner (2015) in the
notation for a level structure with B = B1 this value satisfies IL and LC but not WS.
• LC: The LS-value ϕ defined by ϕ(N, v, B) := Shw(N, v) with wi := w{i} for all i ∈ N
satisfies IL and WS but not LC.
5 Conclusion
It would seem reasonable in our view to use weights if operating players are in some sense
not symmetric, e. g., if some players have not the same political, financial or military
power, contribute more to the result and so on. Often players act not as lone fighters.
They join forces and small groups form together larger groups and so on. So the weighted
Shapley hierarchy levels values meet with the multi-stage mechanism a widespread idea
how a hierarchical value has to operate.
That these values don’t satisfy the null player property is not necessary a disadvantage.
A null player receives a compensation since she supports in an acting coalition the other
members with her contribution to the weight of the coalition. So a null player is only a null
in the coalition function and not necessary in the weight system for coalitions. For further
information on this area see also Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2010) and Go´mez-Ru´a and
Vidal-Puga (2011).
An emphasis of this paper is on consistency. Consistency plays an important role in
many allocation concepts in cooperative game theory. The differences in the numerous
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varieties of the reduced games are decisive for the diversity of the different consistency
characteristics. So our reduced game is no extension of the reduced game in Winter
(1992). There the players which determine the worth in the coalition function of the
reduced game are the original players of the game. In our reduced game determine acting
coalitions in a level game the worths of the coalitions. So also this reduced game coincides
with the reduced game suggested in Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) if the level structure is
trivial since there the players are singletons.
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